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Abstract
The increase in the price of gold between 2002 and 2011 appears to be a candidate for a potential
asset price ‘bubble’, suggesting that chartists (feedbacktraders) were highly active in the gold
market during this period. Hence, this paper develops and tests empirically several models in-
corporating heterogeneous expectations of agents, specifically fundamentalists and chartists, for
the gold market. The empirical results show that both agent types are important in explaining
historical gold prices but that the 10-year bull run of gold in the early 2000s is consistent with
the presence of agents extrapolating long-term trends. Technically this paper is a further step to-
ward providing an empirical foundation for certain assumptions used in the heterogeneous agents
literature. For example, the empirical results presented in this paper compare the economical
and statistical significance of numerous switching variable specifications, that are generally only
introduced ad-hoc.
Keywords: gold price, heterogeneous agents, switching, bubbles, STRmodels
JEL classification:C51, D03, G12.
1. Introduction
Gold prices have exhibited a strong positive trend between 2002 and 2011 with gold rising
from around 300 US dollar in 2002 to values well above 1,900 USdollar per troy ounce in 2011.
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Comparing this to the relatively stable period for the twenty years previous there has been much
discussion about the cause of this upward trajectory. Many commentators have identified the
recent trend as a bubble1 (similar to the sharp rise and subsequent correction in goldprices in the
late 1970s and early 1980s) whilst many others have suggested that there has been a structural
change in the prices and volumes in the gold market—and commodity markets in general—in
recent years.2,3
This paper attempts to shed some light onto these issues throug the use (and estimation) of
a heterogeneous agents model (henceforth HAM) for the gold market in which fundamentalists
are convinced that the price will return to its ‘fundamental’ v ue and chartists, on the other hand,
aim to identify price signals from past price trends. The useof a HAM in the gold market can be
justified by the observation that the historical gold price has exhibited a strong andrelatively long
positive trend which can be explained with chartist tradersbuying an asset whose price increased
in the past thereby enforcing or prolonging the trend. This behaviour is in contrast to a fundamen-
talist, who would trade toward the fundamental value. A longa d positive price trend can thus
only be explained by a continuously rising fundamental value or the presence of chartists. We
think that the latter, i.e. the presence of chartists or chartist-behaviour, is perhaps a more plausible
assumption than a continuously rising fundamental price.
Furthermore, if there is significant evidence for the presence of chartist traders it is likely
that their trades have changed the properties often associated with gold, in particular the store of
value and the safe haven attributes.4 Hence, the chartist-fundamentalist approach offers a new and
promising alterative behavioural perspective on historical gold price dynamics. To the best of our
1See, for example, “Gold price bubble a ‘high probability’ say Deutsche Bank”,Financial Times, Jan-
uary 13, 2011 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2e36ccf4-1f33-11e0-8c1c-00144feab49a.html), or “Cash
out of gold and send kids to college”,Financial Times, August 7, 2012 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
312bf416-d1a7-11e1-bb82-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2K5AdpTV4).
2See, for example, “Gilt-edged argument”,The Economist, April 28, 2011 (http://www.economist.com/
node/18620836).
3The period from 2004 until recently is sometimes referred toas a period of ‘financialization’ of commodities
(e.g. see Tang and Xiong, 2013) since there has been a dramatic increase in the presence of institutional investors in
commodity markets who use these markets for the purpose of asset management. Furthermore, the introduction of
exchange-traded funds around 2002 has augmented this trendby providing both institutional and retail investors with
additional opportunities to obtain exposure to commodities in general and gold in particular.
4Baur and Glover (2012) analyse the affect of increased (speculative) investment on the safe havenproperty of
gold. The safe haven property of gold is closely related to a ‘flight-to-quality’ from stocks to gold.
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knowledge, this is the first such empirical work focusing on the gold market.
Specifically, we develop a parsimonious HAM for the gold market in which agents are as-
sumed to adapt their heterogenous beliefs in response to thearrival of new information, and there-
fore switch between different trading strategies.5 Despite their theoretically appealing features,
however, there are many different alternative model specifications available in the HAMs litera-
ture; each producing potentially different results. With this in mind, we also consider different
variations of our model with different switching specifications.6
Our empirical findings (based on 43 years of monthly data) arein line with predictions from
heterogeneous agent theory. In particular, we find strong evidence that the bubble-like price path
of gold observed during the 1970/80s can be characterized well by short-term trend-followers and
long-term stabilizers (fundamentalists). In more recent times however, the gold price appears more
consistent withlong-termtrend-following and short-termcontrarianchartist behaviour; with little
evidence of ‘classical’ fundamentalist activity. This indicates that the lack of stabilizing agents in
the gold market between 2002 and 2011 was a contributing factor to the steadily increasing gold
price. Furthermore, an alternative specification with asymmetric demands reveals that agents have
generally only followed positive price trends. We explain this result with the significant costs of
short-selling gold.
In regards to the switching within our model, results consistently show that the added flexibility
of agents to adapt their beliefs increases model fit and the significance of agents’ impact on price
dynamics. There is also evidence of consistentqualitativebehaviour of agents (i.e. parameter
sign) across switching variables, but considerable variation in thequantitativeeffects (i.e. model
fit and estimated parameter magnitudes) across switching variables; demonstrating the importance
of considering such alternative model specifications. To this end, we find that simple measures
of gold price volatility and (risk-adjusted) measures of the deviation of the gold price from the
fundamental value of gold perform equally as well as more well-known measures such as the past
5This idea, influenced by the discrete choice modelling literature (see Manski and McFadden, 1981, Anderson
et al., 1993), was developed by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998)who coined it the ‘adaptive belief system’.
6We do not consider exogenous variables in this paper, only endogenous ones, i.e. lagged prices, simple or squared
log-price differences etc. While the use of exogenous variables off r a large set of modelling opportunities the choice
of such variables is not straightforward and we therefore restrict ourselves to a ‘classical’ time-series analysis.
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profit measure introduced by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). It is our hope that a comparison
of the different switching specifications within this market will provide valuable insight for further
theoretical and empirical developments of HAMs for other makets.
Related literature
Models of asset price dynamics based on the interaction of heterogeneous agents have become
increasingly popular in recent years.7 These models are appealing since they allow for more
flexibility in the modelling of investors behaviour than classical rational expectations would allow.
Furthermore, even some of the simpler models in this class appear to explain well many of the
stylized empirical facts of observed asset price dynamics.Such models essentially posit that asset
prices are driven to some degree by an endogenous nonlinear law of motion.
In the majority of the existing theoretical literature, it is found that chartists tend to destabilize
markets (increase volatility), whereas fundamentalists act as a stabilizing force on price dynamics.
The dynamic interaction between these two agent types lead to periods of both mean-reverting and
explosive behaviour.8 To account for the additional role of gold as a real (as opposed to financial)
asset, we also explicitly model the eff ct of real supply and demand on the gold price dynamics,
such effects can be seen to provide an additional stabilizing force on the gold price.
When it comes to the empirical estimation of heterogeneous agent models, there is a develop-
ing literature but there appears still much work to be done. This sentiment is echoed in Chiarella
et al. (2009) who state in their conclusions that “much more ne ds to be done on the calibration
and estimation” of the models surveyed in their paper. The relativ ly late development of empirical
studies in this area is no doubt due to the highly nonlinear nature of such models and the result-
ing econometric issues. In particular, the nonlinear switching mechanism poses some interesting
econometric difficulties in their estimation, difficulties that we will elaborate on in Section 3.
Early work avoided the need to estimate the nonlinear switching mechanism directly by em-
ploying numerous approaches. One intuitive approach used has been to estimate the model using
7For a detailed survey of the history and state-of-the-art ofheterogeneous agents models see Hommes (2006),
Hommes and Wagener (2009), Chiarella et al. (2009), or more rec ntly Chen et al. (2012).
8It is worth noting at this stage that the interpretation of chartists and fundamentalists need not be distinct traders
but different motives of a single individual for changing their holdings.
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a Markov regime-switching model (see for example Vigfusson, 1997, Ahrens and Reitz, 2005,
Chiarella et al., 2012). Other ‘indirect’ estimation methods include the use of filtering techniques
(see Baak, 1999, Chavas, 2000) and simulation based estimation such as those employed in Gilli
and Winker (2001, 2003) and Winker and Gilli (2004). Furthermo e, Alfarano et al. (2005, 2006)
take advantage of a derived closed-form expression for the stationary distribution of returns for a
particular class of HAM to estimate the distribution of agents within a given market.
One important strand of the estimation literature has attemp d to fit certain distributional
properties of model outputs aligned to certain stylized facts of real financial time-series. Such
methods invariably rely on simulation. Work along these lines include He and Li (2011) who
estimate the power-law decay parameters of the autocorrelation of returns, the squared returns
and the absolute returns for the DAX 30 stock market daily closing price index. In a similar vein
Franke (2009) employs the method of simulated moments (MSM)to estimate the model proposed
in Manzan and Westerhoff (2005) for numerous financial time-series. Subsequently, Franke and
Westerhoff (2011, 2012) also employ the MSM to S&P 500 data in the contextof a structural
stochastic volatility model. Here the model parameters arechosen to fit best a selection of nine
simulated summary statistics, or moments, including auto-correlation in raw returns and the well-
known Hill estimator of the tail index of absolute returns.
In the present paper, however, our focus is on the explanation of the observed gold price path
rather than an explanation of the distributional properties of their returns. In this regard there has
also been several attempts to ‘directly’ estimate the nonliear switching mechanisms in the liter-
ature. Boswijk et al. (2007) estimate a version of the Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) model
directly for S&P 500 data using nonlinear least squares and Westerhoff and Reitz (2003, 2005)
and Reitz and Westerhoff (2007) use the STAR-GARCH model introduced by Lundbergh and
Teräsvirta (1998) to estimate various models of chartistsand fundamentalists for daily exchange
rate data, the US corn market, and various other commoditiesmarkets, respectively. More re-
cently, Cornea et al. (2012) investigate behavioral heterog neity in US inflation rate data using
nonlinear least squares and de Jong et al. (2010) estimate a HAM for the exchange-rate dynamics
of the European Monetary System (EMS) using quasi-maximum likelihood techniques. Similar
likelihood techniques are also employed in Kouwenberg and Zwinkels (2010) to investigate the
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behaviour of the US housing market over the last 50 years and in ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010)
when considering oil price dynamics.
The majority of the aforementioned papers find evidence of trade heterogeneity and switching.
However, there is no study which analyzes a heterogeneous model for the gold market despite the
strong positive trend in the gold market in the early 2000s (between 2002 and 2011) and in the late
1970s.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section2 introduces the HAM employed
in this paper and describes the econometric estimation framework. Section 3 presents the esti-
mation results and discusses the economic and statistical implications. Finally we summarise the
main findings and provide concluding remarks in Section 4.
2. The model
There is clearly demand for gold from both industrial uses and s an investment asset.9 Hence
gold acts as a real and financial asset and we therefore chooseto model both real and financial
(speculative) demand for gold in our stylized representation of gold price dynamics. We distin-
guish between these two types of demands in the following way: Real demand is influenced only
by the current gold price, whereas speculative demand—fundamentalist and chartist—is influ-
enced by (heterogeneous) expectations of future gold pricemovements.
Following Farmer and Joshi (2002) we assume a log-linear price impact function which results
in a structural model for the log gold priceP of the following form10













whereD denotes excess demand with the superscriptsM, F, andC indicating market (real econ-
omy), fundamentalist, and chartist demand, respectively.In addition,St denotes the available
9The average annual demand (in tonnes) from industrial uses,including jewellery, over the last five years (2008–
2012 inclusive) accounted for 60% of total demand, with the remainder coming from investment and central bank
purchases (World Gold Council, 2012).
10Note that the log-linear impact function can be interpretedas the stylized behaviour of a market maker, absorbing
temporary imbalances in excess demand (Farmer and Joshi, 2002), or as the outcome of trading via an electronic limit
order book (Chiarella et al., 2009).
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supply of gold at timet, the parameterθ a positive price adjustment coefficient, and crucially,WF
andWC are (possibly) time varying weights to incorporate switching between strategies. Finally,
et denotes a noise term which can be interpreted as the influenceof so-called ‘noise’ traders.
Consistent with ter Ellen and Zwinkels (2010), amongst others, the real demand and supply of
gold is modelled in the following stylized and intuitive waywith
DMt = aM − bMPt and St = aS + bSPt, (2)
wherebM > 0 andbS > 0, indicating that the demand for gold decreases, and the supply of gold
increases, as the gold price rises.11 For the speculative demands we use12
D jt = a j
(
E jt [Pt+1] − Pt
)
, for j = F,C (3)
wherea j are positive reaction coefficients andE
j
t [Pt+1] are the fundamentalists’ and chartists’
expectations of the next period’s gold price. Furthermore,we assume that
EFt [Pt+1] = Pt + bF(Ft − Pt) and E
C
t [Pt+1] = Pt + bC(Pt − Pt−1),
hence fundamentalists expect prices to revert to the fundamental price,F, with some positive
adjustment speedbF.13 Chartists, on the other hand, expect the trend over the previous period (e.g.
month) to continue to some degree, irrespective of the asset’s fundamental value. The parameter
bC is a measure of the direction and magnitude of the expected tren , withbC > 0 andbC <
11Evidence of such a response in real supply and demand can be seen clearly from the the World Gold Council
2012 annual report which states that “the long-term downward trend in jewellery and technology volumes, against a
backdrop of a twelve-year bull run in gold prices, has seen thir share of total demand eroded”. Furthermore, they
note that there has also been a rising trend in mining production, rising year-on-year for the previous five years and
currently at 2,847.7tonnes, 9% above the 5-year average (World G ld Council, 2012). Such a response to an increasing
gold price is consistent with the real optionality of gold mines to expand production during times of higher output
prices.
12The model we employ here can be considered a behavioural model. Th rules used by the fundamentalists and
chartists to determine demand are simply rules of thumb or heu istics rather than being derived by rational expected
utility maximisation. For examples of agents demand functions derived from utility maximisation see Chiarella et al.
(2007, 2009).
13A negativebF would indicate that fundamentalists expect prices to diverge f om the fundamental value.
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0 corresponding to trend-following and contrarian strategies, respectively. We note that these
stylized chartist and fundamentalist demand functions have been chosen to capture the stabilizing
force of fundamental traders and the trend-following nature of chartists.
2.1. The fundamental value
A key ingredient in the model above is the specification ofF, the fundamental value of gold.
However, the determination of such a fundamental value is challenging. The main difficulty being
that, unlike equity and other contingent claims, gold provides no expected future cash-flow to
the investor, other than potential capital gains. Therefore, there appears no clear, or commonly
agreed, way to determine, or even define, the fundamental value of gold.14 One candidate driver
of a fundamental price present in the literature is that its real value is simply constant. This
assumption implies that gold (like other commodities) provides a natural hedge against inflation.15
However, using such information to determine a fundamentalvalue is far from straightforward.16
An alternative argument is that, since gold is used as a storeof value and a safe haven for many
investors (see Baur and Lucey, 2010), the fundamental priceof gold could depend on the economic
state of other markets. This dependence, however, could only be introduced in an ad hoc manner
and would require the use of exogenous variables, which is outside the scope of our present study.17
Given such difficulties in identifying a suitable candidate for the fundamental price of com-
modities, previous estimation of HAMs in such markets have made various simplifying assump-
tions about the fundamental value. Westerhoff and Reitz (2003, 2005) and Reitz and Westerhoff
(2007) appeal to the stationary nature of some commodity prices and take the fundamental value
to be simply the average of the price over the investigated time period.18 Alternatively, ter Ellen
14Articles in the Financial Times, The Economist and the Wall Street Journal suggest that there is a consensus
that the fundamental value of gold is unknown. Gold is “hard to value” (The Economist, 2013), “has no fundamental
value” (Financial Times, 2013), and “can’t be measured in the same way as other financial assets” (Wall Street Journal,
2013).
15Since the gold price is denominated in government currencies, its nominal value will increase if the value of this
currency is eroded by inflation or other factors.
16Furthermore, Blose (2010), using data from 1988–2008, reports that changes in expected inflation, does not
appear to significantly affect the price of gold, casting doubt on the validity of this asa fundamental driver of the gold
price.
17Baker and Van Tassel (1985) is an example of a study that uses exogenous variables to model the price of gold.
18Clearly this method would involve some form of look-ahead bias and as such would not be useful for forecasting.
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and Zwinkels (2010), when considering oil price dynamics, follow Schwartz and Smith (2000)
and proxy the fundamental price as a two-year moving average.
Similar to the latter authors, and motivated by the aforementioned difficulties, we also choose
to interpret the fundamental value, and hence fundamentalism, in a wider context by defining
the fundamental valueF to be a long-run equilibrium price approximated by an exponentially
weighted moving average (EWMA) of historical gold prices with a half-life of two years (and
hence a decay parameter of approximately 0.9715). The use ofa m ving average as a proxy for
the fundamental value can be motivated further by noting that if the fundamental value is difficult
to estimate then traders may look to other investors for an indication of the fundamental value.
Hence if recent prices have been high then such investors’ fundamental value estimate is likely
biased upwards by this fact. In other words, under these conditi s fundamental value estimates
may beanchoredto recent market prices.
Figure 1 shows the gold price dynamics along with our proxy for its fundamental value. What-
ever ones opinion on the fundamental price of gold we think that i is safe to argue that the extreme
change in the price of gold from values around 300 US dollars to values above 1, 900 US dollars
between 2002 and 2011 cannot be solely explained with a change in the fundamental price of gold.
2.2. Switching
The switching between expectations is governed by the weightsWCt andW
F
t , which we assume
to sum to unity, i.e. thatWt :=WCt = 1−W
F
t for all t. In line with the extant literature, we assume
that such switching could involve an element of delay due to agents’ firmly held beliefs; a form
of status quo bias (Kahneman et al., 1982). We therefore employ a standard logistic function as
the switchingmechanismto model such a bias. We also consider an array of different switching
variableswithin this switching mechanism; some drawn from the existing HAMs literature and
others, to the best of our knowledge, that are used for the first time here.19 The switching function
19We note that our consideration of multiple switching variables within a fixed switching mechanism is consistent
with the results of Franke and Westerhoff (2012), who perform a model contest between different switching mecha-
nisms (deterministic vs. stochastic) and different switching variables (past-profits etc.), with the results indicating the
primary importance of switching variables over the actual switching mechanism. It should be noted, however, that the
results of Franke and Westerhoff (2012) are within a model with a different noise structure than that employed in the
present paper.
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we use is therefore given by





wherest denotes the observable switching variable for which different specifications are enter-
tained. The parameterγ, which can be either positive or negative, dictates the speed at which
agents switch their beliefs and is also called the ‘intensity of choice’ parameter. The thresholdc
denotes the value around which the logistic function above is c ntered. For some switching speci-
fications economic intuition will compel us to setc = 0, but for other specifications this value will
be empirically estimated. We also choose to normalise by thestandard deviation of the switching
variableσs to aid with the comparison ofγ across specifications (cf. Silvennoinen and Thorp,
2013).
Note that 0≤ Wt(st, γ, c) ≤ 1 and that lim|γ|→∞Wt(st, γ, c) = I (st − c > 0), whereI (·) denotes
the indicator function; hence smooth switching reduces to abrupt (binary) switching when the
parameter|γ| → ∞. Switching can therefore be either abrupt or smooth, with the nature of the
switching ultimately estimated. We also see that a high value of st corresponds to the chartists
regime (ifγ is estimated to be positive; the reverse occurring ifγ is negative).
Note further that we choose our baseline switching variableto be the standard relative past
performance measure of the two trading strategies considered; as was introduced in Brock and
Hommes (1997, 1998). The particular performance measure employed here is inspired by De
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006), amongst others, and corresponds to the average realised holding-









(Pt−i − Pt−i−1) sign(D
j
t−i−1), for j = C, F
whereD jt−i−1 denotes the holdings at the beginning of the period,Pt−i − Pt−i−1 the realised return
over the period, andL the number of periods over which the past performance is evaluated. The
switching variable is thus calculated asst = πCt − π
F
t .
We will also consider a risk-adjusted version of the realised profit measure—similar to a Sharpe
10






L,t is a proxy for the risk of strategyj.
20 For simplicity we
assume the risk of all strategies are equal and approximatedby the sample standard deviation of
gold returns over the same period as the past profits are evaluated (i.e. the previousL periods).
The comparison of profits withrisk-adjustedprofits not only provides a check for the robustness
of our results, but also allows us to assess whether the inclusion of risk-adjustment adds to the
model fit.
In addition to these strategy dependent switching variables w also investigate other, non-
strategy dependent, variables. Such variables can be considered ‘market variables’ as they measure
a particular aspect of the current state of the market, e.g. the volatility of the market or the differ-
ence between the current price and the fundamental price. Wechose a further three economically
justifiable market variables, to produce a total of five different switching variables considered.
These switching variables provide a robustness check for our es lts and offer additional insights
into the activity of the heterogenous agents within the goldmarket.21
The first market variable considered is the estimated standard eviation (volatility) of gold
returns, denoted ˆσL,t, which is calculated using the standard statistical estimator applied over the
previousL periods. Note that we address the effect of volatility indirectly in the risk-adjustment of
the realised profits, however we also choose to consider thisvariable in its own right.22 The second
switching variable is the current price deviation from the fundamental value, given by|Ft − Pt|,
and the third a risk-adjusted version of this, given by|Ft − Pt |/σ̂L,t. Similar switching variables
have been employed previously in the literature, for example in Westerhoff and Reitz (2003, 2005),
who motivate such a specification by stating that the larger th deviation from fundamentals—the
larger the bubble—the greater the attention placed on the market by technical traders. However,
such attention may be modulated by the volatility of the market as increased price volatility results
in a higher risk to such chartist trading strategies.
20An alternative would be to perform the risk-adjustment in the form of a realised utility (for example using ˜πt =
πt − 0.5ησ̂2L,t for some risk-aversion parameterη) as was done in Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). However, we do
not derive agents’ demands from utility theory and so we choose not to do this here.
21It is noteworthy that we use the switching variables as alternatives in different specifications and not in one model
as in Lof (2012); who considered a single transition function depending on multiple transition variables.
22Westerhoff and Reitz (2005) state that a high volatility period makes trading more risky and technical traders are
consequently less eager to enter the market. This variable allows us to test this (theoretical) assumption directly.
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Finally, we discuss the thresholdc employed in the switching mechanism (4). When consider-
ing the realised profit differential as our switching variable it is natural to assume thatc = 0, since
one would expect chartists to dominate (W > 0.5) in periods where the past performance of such a
strategy dominates that of the alternative (πC > πF).23 Furthermore, we remark that the threshold
c can be seen to play a similar role to the parameterγ in modelling the status quo bias since such
a bias would result in agents’ unwillingness to switch strategies unless the profit differential is
sufficiently high to overcome this bias. Therefore, in order to retain parsimony, we focus on the
c = 0 case. However, for the market state variables (standard deviation and the absolute deviation
from fundamentals) we must setc ≥ 0, since these variables are, by definition, non-negative.
Having clarified our switching mechanism, the dynamics to beestimated can be summarised—
after substitution of Eqs. (3) and (2) into Eq. (1)—as follows:
∆Pt+1 = φ0 + φ1Pt + φC
[




(1−Wt(st, γ, c))(Ft − Pt)
]
+ et+1 (5)
whereφ0 := θ(aM − aS) andφ1 := −θ(bM + bS) characterise the effects of the real economy on
prices andφC := θaCbC andφF := θaFbF quantify the price impact of chartists and fundamentalists,
respectively. Furthermore,∆Pt+1 := Pt+1 − Pt and the switching functionWt is given by Eq. (4),
where the switching variablest is chosen to be one of the five specifications listed in Table 1.
*** Insert Table 1 about here ***
To aid our understanding of the above dynamics we observe from Eq. (5) that in the absence
of speculative traders, i.e.φC = φF = 0, the resulting dynamics are simply an AR(1) process,
which is mean reverting (to the level−φ0/φ1) for φ1 < 0. Hence real supply and demand can act
as a stabilizing force in the gold market and would result in amean-reverting gold price consistent
with standard economic theory.24
23A non-zero threshold may be justified if there are substantial differences in the costs of implementing the com-
peting strategies, or if there is a cost to switching betweenth m. However, given the lack of fundamental knowledge
to be obtained in the gold market, we do not expect this to be a reasonable assumption.
24It is also possible thatφ1 > 0. This would indicate an explosive price process as estimated for some specifications
below. However such a result would not be consistent with thelaw of supply and demand.
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The following section explains the estimation procedure fothe above model and presents our
empirical findings.
3. Empirical analysis
The model given in Eq. (5) belongs to the class of smooth transitio regression (STR) mod-
els.25 It is noteworthy that the autoregressive term is assumed notto vary across the two regimes
and that the specification within each regime is different.
Due to the nonlinearities induced by the switching mechanism, t has been well documented
(see, for example, de Jong et al., 2009) that estimation results for similar models are usually highly
sensitive to the starting values used, particularly in regards to the intensity of choice parameterγ.26
Within the smooth transition model literature, Teräsvirta (1994) also notes that the estimation of
the parameterγ may involve problems such as slow convergence of the estimation routine and
difficulty in determining the significance of the resulting estimate.
Given these well documented empirical issues we employ the following standard estimation
procedure: We perform a grid-search using conditional least squares estimation over an extensive
(γ, c) parameter space.27 The selection criterion is the estimatedR2.28
The selection of the appropriate number of lags (L) for the past profit function, as well as
the sample period over which the statistical estimates of the market-based switching variables are
estimated, is also based on the goodness-of-fit measureR2.29
The remainder of this section provides a descriptive analysis of the data followed by the pre-
sentation and discussion of the estimation results and the nec ssary robustness checks.
25This class of models was introduced by Ozaki (1985) and developed further in Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992),
Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994). Other applications of STR models within the HAMs literature
can be found in Taylor et al. (2001) and Reitz and Taylor (2008), among others.
26This is due to optimization procedures identifying local optima (see Gilli and Winker, 2001, Winker and Gilli,
2004).
27The parametersγ andc are often called nuisance parameters within the STR literature.
28The estimation procedure is similar to Leybourne et al. (1998) but usesR2 instead of the residual sum of squares
(RSS). In addition, we note that the range ofγ involves both positive and negative values and that the valuesγ = ±∞
(whereW is an indicator function) are also considered in the grid search to assess the performance of abrupt switching.
The search range ofc is chosen to be simply the range of observed outcomes of the switching variablest.
29It can be shown that the commonly used information criteria AIC and BIC for the lag selection are closely related
to R2. More specifically, a high (low)R2 is equal to low (high) AIC and BIC measures. We used a simple Monte
Carlo simulation to obtain this result.
13
3.1. Data
We use monthly data of the price of gold in US dollars per troy ounce as quoted on the London
Bullion Market in the morning (A.M. official). The sample period is January 1970 until December
2012. We use mid-month log-prices denoted asPt to calculate the monthly differences/returns
(∆Pt). The total number of observations isT = 516.30
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
Figure 1 presents the price of gold and the return of gold based on the log-price changes.
The time-series plot illustrates the strong positive trendfrom 2002–2011 associated with a higher
volatility in that period. It also reveals the trajectory ofa potential bubble and subsequent crash
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The average price for the 43-year period is 435 US dollars and
the standard deviation is 350 US dollars. Hence, the averagepric of gold over the year 2012 was
about three to four standard deviations above its long-termmean.
*** Insert Table 2 about here ***
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the gold return and the eviation of the gold price from
the fundamental value—the drivers of both chartists’ and fundamentalists’ demand, respectively.
In addition to the full sample, we also choose to split the sample into two, roughly equal, periods
(1970–1991 and 1992–2012) to assess the variation in these statistics over time. An advantage
of the split is that the first period is characterised by a period of rising and falling prices, i.e.
a correction, while the second sub-sample is characterisedby a rising price of gold without a
substantial correction. This feature may be important to asses the role of trend-following and
stabilizing behaviour.
30We also consider futures as an alternative and a robustness ch ck. However, due to the ‘roll’ costs associated with
the expiry of futures contracts, results may be different.
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We observe that the average monthly return over the whole sample is 0.75 percent and the
standard deviation is 5.97 percent, with the first sub-sample period having a slightly higher re-
turn (and associated higher standard deviation) than the second sub-sample period. In addition,
typical of many financial time-series, we also observe clearevidence of non-normality in returns,
particularly fat tails, over both periods. Another notablefeature of the returns distribution is the
observed positive skewness during the first sub-sample compared to a negative skew in the more
recent sample. In regards to the deviation of the gold price fom the fundamental value, the mean
and median of both sample periods are negative, indicating that prices were above fundamentals
for the majority of the time.31
We also examined the autocorrelation function (ACF) of monthly gold returns during the full
and two sub-sample periods and found significant positive first-o der autocorrelation over the first
sub-sample and stronger negative first-order autocorrelation in the second sub-sample. The dif-
ferences of the time-series characteristics between the sub-samples indicate that the split of the
sample is an important part of the empirical analysis.
3.2. Estimation results
The presentation and discussion of the estimation results is structured as follows: First, we
present the estimates of a model without any switching mechanism for the full and sub-sample
periods as a preliminary analysis and to act as a benchmark tocompare the subsequent switching
specifications. Second, we present the estimation results for he HAM with the different switching
variables employed. We also estimate these results for the full sample and two sub-sample peri-
ods to assess the robustness of the estimation results, and to assess how, given the long sample
period chosen, agents behaviour may have changed over time.Third, and finally, to provide more
granularity in our results we estimate a modification of our full switching model which allows for
asymmetry in agents’ demands.
A preliminary analysis revealed that the gold price exhibited very different dynamics during
the first sub-sample period (covering the ‘bubble’ of the 1970s/80s) than it did in the second period
31In fact, over the whole sample the price was above fundamentals for 366 out of the observed 516 months (approx.
71% of the time), with the sub-sample numbers being 197/264 (75%) for the first period and 169/252 (67%) for the
second period. This is perhaps unsurprising in a period of steadily rising prices.
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(capturing the potential bubble of the 2000s). We thereforechoose to focus our attention on each
sub-period, rather than trying to infer consistent behaviour over the relatively long 43 year period,
in which there have been important institutional changes inthe market for gold.32
No-switching
We use the no-switching case as a benchmark to determine if adding the switching improves
model fit and is economically meaningful. We also estimate the model with no speculative traders
(in which case we have a simple AR(1) process) and with only either chartists or fundamental-
ists active. This provides a full picture of the significanceof agents’ behaviour (in the absence
of switching). The estimation results are presented in Table 3 and illustrate that chartists and
fundamentalists indeed improve the fit of the model to the data.33
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***
We see from the model with both agents active (W = 0.5) that the implied equilibrium value
(calculated ase−φ0/φ1) for the full sample is $595.19, as well as $375.40 and $955.99 in the first
and second sub-sample, respectively.
We also observe that fundamentalists explain the most over the whole sample, whereas chartists
add the most to the explanatory power over the two sub-samples. Furthermore, chartists appear
to be following positive feedback (momentum) strategies during the first sub-sample but negative
feedback (contrarian) strategies during the second sub-sample. The low explanatory power of
chartists over the whole sample is therefore most likely dueto the differing behaviour of such
agents ‘cancelling out’ over the full sample.
32The main institutional change in the market for gold is the introduction of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on gold
which allows both institutional and retail investors to obtain direct exposure to the spot price of gold. This increased
opportunity set of investors may also have caused changes oftheir behaviour.
33Note that, due to non-stationarity, the t-values of the AR(1)-terms are adjusted using the Dickey-Fuller tables
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). The other coefficients (φC andφF) need no adjustment due to the stationarity of the
related variables. We used an Augmented Dickey-Fuller testto assess the stationarity of the variables and the results
of Stock (1994) who demonstrates that the coefficient estimates of the lagged differences (in contrast to lagged levels)
follow a standard asymptotic normal distribution.
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In regards to fundamentalist behaviour, we observe no significa ce in both sub-samples and
low significance (to the 10% level) over the whole sample. Themost notable observation, however,
is that the sign of the estimated parameterφF is negative in all sample periods. If the negative sign
persists for a more comprehensive model with switching, we must re-interpret the nature of such
‘fundamentalist’ strategies. Recall that a positiveφF indicates a long-term price stabilizer (trading
towards a long-term moving average). A negative coeffici nt, therefore, can be interpreted as
a contrarian fundamentalist or a positive feedback trader using a long-term average (F) as their
trading signal. In other words, such agents purchase gold ifthe price is above the long-term
moving average since they are extrapolating long-term trends (as opposed to the short-term trends
considered by the agents labeled chartists). Such agents canot be seen as a stabilizing force in
the gold market.34
Finally, we observe that in the absence of speculative traders, the AR(1) process in the most
recent sub-sample exhibits explosive behaviour (consistent with the expansion of a potential price
bubble). However, the addition of our speculative agents into the model specification, whilst also
increasing greatly the explanatory power, removes this explosive characteristic, indicating that the
presence of both agents can account for the explosive natureof th AR(1) process in recent times.
In other words, once we add the speculative traders to our model specification the source of the
explosive behaviour is identified and the AR(1) coefficient becomes negative, consistent with the
demand for gold from the real economy.
Whilst the above results provide some evidence of the impactof agents’ heterogenous expec-
tations on gold prices it is clear that the addition of switching is necessary to provide a much more
satisfactory fit to the observed data.
Switching
We now present the estimation results for the switching model with different switching vari-
ables considered. Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the results for thefull sample and the two sub-sample
periods, respectively.
34Trend-following ‘fundamentalist’ behavior can be explained with investors who cannot afford to trade against the
market and thus ride the trend, or the bubble, as suggested byBrunnermeier (2008).
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*** Insert Tables 4, 5 and 6 about here ***
We note that the addition of switching (PD, PDA, STD, DF and DFA in comparison to ‘static’)
increases the fit to the data and furthermore increases the significance of the speculative demand
considerably in most cases. In addition, the signs of the coeffi ientsφ0 andφ1 are consistent
over all the full sample and the first sub-sample periods indicating the continued presence of
stabilizing real demand and supply. Their insignificance, however, suggests their eff cts are weak
in comparison to those of the speculative traders. The results are mixed for the second sub-sample
period with some switching variables failing to explain theexplosive price behaviour in this period.
The switching variables are discussed in more detail below.We first discuss the strategy-
dependent switching variables—the profit differences PD and PDA—and then focus on the market-
dependent switching variables—the return volatility STD and the price deviations from the esti-
mate of the fundamental value DF and DFA.
Strategy-dependent switching
When considering the full sample period, the estimated coeffi i ntsφC andφF are both found
to be negative, as in the no-switching (‘static’) case, and therefore the dynamics over the whole
sample are best explained by short-term contrarian chartists and long-term trend-following ‘fun-
damentalists’ with no evidence for stabilizing fundamentalis s. The only stabilizing force being
real supply and demand. However, as noted previously, interpretation of results covering such a
long period should be treated with caution and so we choose inst ad to focus our attention on the
two sub-sample periods.
In stark contrast to the results for the full sample, the firstsub-sample period (1970–1991)
reveals the chartist and fundamentalist coefficients to be of the opposite sign (both positive) and
highly significant. This provides strong evidence in favourf speculator-driven price dynam-
ics consistent with the traditional chartist-fundamentalis paradigm, with destabilizing short-term
(trend-following) chartists and stabilizing long-term fundamentalists. The considerable increase in
model fit, withR2 increasing from 3.81% to 10.06% after the addition of switching, also suggests
that switching between such ‘classical’ agents is an important feature of the gold price dynamics
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during these years. Other notable results from the first sub-sample period are that risk-adjustment
does not appear to significantly affect the results and that the switching is estimated to be relativ ly
smooth withγ equal to 4.56 and 4.25 for the PD and PDA specifications, respectively.35
For the second sub-sample period (1992–2012) the picture isdrastically different to the first
(but similar to the full sample). We observe strong evidenceof short-termcontrarian chartist
behaviour despite the clear upward trend in the gold price. At first blush it would appear that this
finding is contradictory to the undeniable positive price trend. However, the large negative value
of φF indicates that the contrarian chartists are joined by long-run trend-following agents which
can explain the steady upward trend.
*** Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here ***
Figures 2 and 3 plot the time dependence of the estimated weights for the PD specification for
the first and second sub-sample period, respectively.36 We observe active switching during the first
sub-sample period and that the market was dominated by short-term trend-following chartists in
the run-up to the ‘bubble’ of the 1970s/80s. We also observe much less variation in the estimated
weights in the second sub-sample period in comparison to thefirst; the weights remain around 0.5
for the majority of the sample period, with only a slight deviation during the recent global financial
crisis.
Such evidence, along with only moderate increases in the fit of the model when switching is
added, suggests that switching between agents in the secondsub-sample period is not a dominant
feature of the dynamics. This perhaps is intuitive since theagents identified in this period are ‘non-
classical’, being long-term trend-followers and short-tem contrarians. Agents can profit from
both strategies at the same time due to the different time horizons involved. Short-term contrarians
35We note from unreported results (available upon request) tha w en considering the case of a non-zero threshold
(c , 0) we observe that switching is always estimated to be abrupt, i.e. |γ| = ∞. This result is no doubt related to the
previously mentioned observation that the thresholdc plays a similar role in modelling the status-quo bias of agents as
the parameterγ. Such additional results are consistent with observationsfr m the smooth transition literature, finding
that for (volatile) financial switching variables abrupt switching is often estimated (Silvennoinen and Thorp, 2013).
36The plots for the PDA specification looks very similar and arethus not reported.
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profit from a short-term negative autocorrelation in returns a d long-term trend-followers profit
from an increasing price over the longer term. Hence both strategies can profit and neither would
necessarily dominate, consistent with the empirically observed switching.
Market-dependent switching
Given the observed difficulty in inferring consistent behaviour over the full sample eriod, and
in the interests of brevity, we do not discuss the results forthe full sample period; instead we focus
on the results for the two sub-sample periods. The estimation results, however, are presented for
completeness.
For both sub-sample periods, the estimated signs show a consistent pattern across all switching
variables, whereas the size, significance, and model fit showconsiderable variation; indicating the
importance of considering alternative switching specifications. In the first sub-sample (1970–
1991) the coefficient estimatesφC andφF are both positive and significant (and hence consistent
with the strategy dependent switching results) for all switching variables. The only exception being
that the estimate ofφF for the DF switching specification is positive but statistically insignificant.
This result indicates that the risk adjustment to the current d viation of the gold price from its
long-run (fundamental) value is an important consideration.
We also observe a negative (infinitely large)γ estimate for the STD specification, representing
an abrupt switching mechanism with trend-following chartists active in the low volatility regime
and stabilizing fundamentalists active in the high volatility regime. This finding is consistent with
the ideas of Westerhoff and Reitz (2005) who state that a high volatility period makes trading more
risky and technical traders are consequently less eager to enter the market.
The results for the second sub-sample (1992–2012) are once mor characterised by nega-
tive coefficients forφC andφF for all switching variables, consistent with the strategy dependent
switching results. Furthermore, the estimated positive sign of the coefficientγ for the STD spec-
ification indicates that it is now the long-term trend-followers who are active in the low volatility
regime with the short-term contrarians dominant in the highvolatility regime.
The above results (for both strategy-dependent and market variables) identify trend-following
chartists and stabilizing fundamentalists for the sample period which is characterised by both a
20
substantial price increase and a correction (1970–1991) while we find contrarian chartists and
trend-following ‘fundamentalists’ in the period which is characterised by a substantial price in-
crease and the absence of a correction. These distinctivelydifferent results for different price
processes is perhaps not surprising and indicates that chartists nd fundamentalists may also adapt
their strategies through time.
Asymmetric demand
To sharpen our understanding of agents’ behaviour further,w now consider the possibility of
asymmetric demand, i.e. that chartists’ trend-following behaviour could be different when chasing
an upward trend, as opposed to a downward trend, and that fundamentalists act differently when
prices are below long-run fundamentals than when they are above. We note that such asymmetries
could arise from investors’ behavioural biases as well as institutional factors such as short-selling
constraints etc. As such, the model to be estimated is amended to
∆Pt+1 = φ0 + φ1Pt +Wt(st, γ, c)
[
φCp(Pt − Pt−1)












where (·)+ := max(·, 0) and (·)− := min(·, 0). The switching variable specifications remain un-
changed. The results of these augmented estimations are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9 for the full
sample and two sub-sample periods, respectively.
*** Insert Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here ***
The majority of the observations made above in regards to theempirical results for the sym-
metric demand specification, and their variation across switching variables and sample periods,
remain valid for the augmented demand specification. For example, once more we demonstrate
that sub-sample estimates provide a better model fit than a full-sample fit. In the interest of brevity,
therefore, we only focus on the most salient results.
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Firstly, and most importantly, we see clear evidence of asymmetry in agents’ expectations. In
the first sub-sample period we observe strong evidence of trend-following behaviour in a rising
market but much weaker evidence of such behaviour in a falling market; both in terms of size and
significance of the coefficients. Such a result is perhaps related to the existence of financial or
regulatory constraints on selling gold short—since trend-followers’ demand is positive, and hence
requires no short selling, only when prices are rising. The fundamentalists also exhibit asymmetry
with a much stronger presence (in terms of significance) whent prices are above the fundamental
value.
For the second sub-sample period we see clearly that the contraria nature of the short-term
chartists is almost entirely focused on responses to an upward price movement. In other words,
such agents expect that prices will fall following a short-term rise in price. The size of the esti-
mated coefficient is also very large in magnitude indicating a large predict price reversal. When
considering the fundamentalist behaviour, or long-term trend-followers as they must be labelled
in this period, we once more observe asymmetry in their actions, with a more significant presence
when prices are above the long-run fundamental (indicatinga positive demand for gold). Once
again this is consistent with financial or regulatory constraints on short-selling.
Discussion
We now provide a more general discussion of the possible implications of our empirical results.
Our results can be interpreted in the context of Brunnermeier (2008), who states that if a bubble
persists, and prices become ‘too’ high, it may become optimal for fundamental traders to switch to
more chartist strategies andri e the bubble as they cannot afford to trade against the market. This is
what we have observed empirically in the gold market with the‘fundamentalist’ beliefs apparently
switching from stabilizing behaviour,φF > 0, to de-stabilizing (trend-following) behaviour,φF <
0, in the 1992–2012 period. Our results suggest that fundamentalists have switched to a trend-
following strategy in response to a long-lasting episode ofincreasing prices which made it too
costly to speculate against the trend. In order to survive they adopted a trend-following strategy.37
37This finding of time-varying parameters may also be explained with agents’ learning as discussed, for example,
in De Grauwe and Markiewicz (2013).
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Furthermore, the absence of a commonly accepted fundamental value in the gold market may
have exacerbated this process and has perhaps delayed the return of fundamentalist behaviour to
the gold market in recent years, despite the record high prices.
Given this interpretation we may attempt to ask such question as: “What are the implications
of these results for the future?” and “will the price trend bereversed fast or slow?” Our empirical
results provide some hints in answering these questions since there is no evidence that chartists
have historically chased trends downwards. A market without fundamentalists, and chartists only
chasing upward trends, would result in dynamics that have a sharp upward trajectory and then
only a slow decline due to the mean-reverting force of real supply and demand. If the chartists
also followed downward trends, or fundamentalists returned to the market, we could then observe
a sharp correction to the ‘bubble’, i.e. a crash.
Robustness Checks
We have performed several specification checks to assess therobustness of the results reported
above. Some of these checks have been reported and discussedexplicitly and others have not
been explicitly reported and the discussion has been saved for this section. All results presented in
this paper are comprised of full sample estimates and two sub-sample estimates. This sub-sample
analysis has been discussed extensively and revealed that the evolution of the price of gold is
better characterised by two different regimes (1970–1991 and 1992–2012) than one regime only.
We have also analysed the residuals, standardised residuals and squared standardised residuals for
each estimated model in a post-estimation specification check and found that there is no remaining
autocorrelation in the residuals for the second sub-samplebut some remaining autocorrelation for
the first sub-sample and the full sample period. This result inot surprising given the superior fit
of the 1992–2012 data set compared to the 1970–1991 data and the full sample period. Since we
have derived the econometric model from a standard theoretical heterogeneous agents model and
considered a large set of possible switching variables including specifications with no switching
we have not considered alternative econometric models to preserve the one-to-one mapping of the
theoretical model with the econometric model.
We have also analysed the robustness of the estimation results with respect to a different funda-
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mental value based on a shorter moving average half-life of 12 months compared to the 24 months
used in this paper. The results appear robust to changes in the specification of the fundamental
value, i.e. the approximate size, sign and significance of most estimates remain unchanged. The
notable differences are that the switching is estimated to be more abruptand the length over which
past performance is evaluated (for the profit switching variables) is increased.
We also considered a higher data frequency, i.e. daily data,but found no significant quali-
tative differences compared to monthly data. Finally, we analysed altern tive data series: silver
spot prices and gold futures data at a monthly frequency. Forboth series the results are qualita-
tively very similar but the coefficients are generally smaller in absolute terms and the statistic l
significance is weaker. For example, for silver, the negative autocorrelation in the second sample
period is present but less significant and hence it appears tht contrarian traders are less active
in the silver market. There is also weaker evidence of long-term trend-followers in the silver
market. Since anecdotal and econometric evidence suggeststhat gold is driving the gold-silver
relationship, weaker effects for silver should perhaps be expected.
4. Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we analysed the price of gold using a pure time-serie econometrics approach
derived from a theoretical heterogenous agents model with fundamentalists and chartists. We are
thus able to test theoretical assumptions like the role of market volatility on the activity of chartists
and fundamentalists and assess the contribution of chartists and fundamentalists to mean-reverting
or explosive (bubble-like) price paths. Our analysis encompasses econometric specifications with
no switching (fixed ‘static’ weights of chartists and fundamentalists) and switching based on five
different—strategy-dependent and market-dependent—switching variables. The former are profit
functions depending on the success of employed strategies while the latter are characteristics of
the market, i.e. volatility and deviations from the fundamental value.
The estimation results show that both chartists and fundamentalists employ strategies condi-
tional on the price dynamics, i.e. chartists are trend-followers in the 1970s and 1980s and short-
term contrarians in the 2000s. In contrast, we find that fundamentalists use stabilizing (mean-
reverting) strategies in the 1970s and 1980s and long-term trend-following in the 2000s. Whilst
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the contrarian chartists explain the negative first-order autocorrelation present in gold price dy-
namics the trend-following fundamentalists explain the bubble-like behaviour between 2002 and
2011. The results indicate that fundamentalists were ‘riding the bubble’ in this period.
An asymmetric analysis further reveals that chartists are mostly active in regimes of increasing
gold prices which can be explained with significant costs of sh rt selling. This finding also sug-
gests that a correction of a gold price well above the fundamental value occurs only slowly and
makes a sudden crash unlikely.
Furthermore, we also find that abrupt and smooth switching depends on the switching vari-
able. For example, volatility and deviations from the fundamental value of gold often yield abrupt
switching while past-profit functions generally yield muchsmoother switching. Finally, there is
strong evidence that switching increases the fit of the empirical data to the theoretically-derived
econometric model.
This paper contributes to the literature on heterogeneous agents models with an empirical
application of such models to the gold market. The estimation results reveal that the interaction
of both chartists and fundamentalists can explain a significant part of the historical evolution of
the gold price and suggests that the period between 2002 and 2011 was at least partially caused by
trend-following trading strategies of investors consistent with the presence of a bubble.
Future research could extend our analysis by considering the role of chartists and fundamen-
talists on the volatility of the gold price or commodities ingeneral. Such an analysis may further
extend the empirical literature on heterogeneous agent models.
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Figures
Figure 1: Top: The gold price (solid line) and fundamental value estimate (dashed line). Bottom: The corresponding
monthly returns.












Figure 2: 1970–1991: The estimated chartists’ weightWt for the PD (profit difference) specification over the first
sub-sample period (top) with the gold price and fundamentalestimate (bottom) for comparison.

















Figure 3: 1992–2012: The estimated chartists’ weightWt for the PD (profit difference) specification over the second
sub-sample period (top) with the gold price and fundamentalestimate (bottom) for comparison.














Table 1: Summary of the switching variables employed.
strategy dependent
PD profit difference πCt − π
F
t




STD return standard deviation (volatility) ˆσL,t
DF deviation from fundamental |Ft − Pt|
DFA risk-adj. deviation from fundamental |Ft − Pt|/σ̂L,t
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the the full sample and two sub-sample periods.
1970–2012 1970–1991 1992–2012
∆P F − P ∆P F − P ∆P F − P
Mean 0.0075 –0.1730 0.0088 –0.2215 0.0062 –0.1222
Median 0.0019 –0.1289 0.0020 –0.1504 0.0019 –0.0550
Maximum 0.4078 0.2677 0.4078 0.2224 0.2063 0.2677
Minimum –0.2261 –1.1973 –0.2171 –1.1973 –0.2261 –0.5925
Std. Dev. 0.0597 0.2634 0.0692 0.2877 0.0480 0.2248
Skewness 0.8826 –0.8065 1.1017 –0.9255 –0.0370 –0.2022
Kurtosis 5.9400 0.3094 5.1040 0.1011 4.4138 –1.2511
AC(1) 0.0070 0.1261 –0.2577
# Obs. 516 516 264 264 252 252
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Table 3: Estimation results for no switching, i.e. withWt ≡ 0, 0.5, and 1, for full sample and two sub-sample
periods. Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets. Model:∆Pt+1 = φ0 +
φ1Pt + φC [W(Pt − Pt−1)] + φF [(1 −W)(Ft − Pt)] + et+1, whereW = 1 implies that only chartists (C) are active,
W = 0 implies that only fundamentalists (F) are active,W = 0.5 implies that both chartists and fundamentalists are
active. A negative (positive) coefficient ofφ1 indicates mean-reversion (explosiveness) associated with real economy
factors, a positive (negative) coefficient ofφC andφF implies trend-following (contrarian) chartists and stabilizing
(trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively.
Full sample (1970–2012) –N = 516
AR(1) W = 1 W = 0 W = 0.5
φ0 0.0435 0.0443 0.0457 0.0460
(2.29) (2.31) (2.39) (2.40)
φ1 –0.0062 –0.0064 –0.0071 –0.0072





R2 0.71% 0.73% 1.37% 1.40%
adj-R2 0.52% 0.34% 0.99% 0.82%
F-stat 3.6550 1.8860 3.5490 2.4200
d f 1/514 2/512 2/512 3/511
p-val 0.0565 0.1528 0.0295 0.0653
First sub-sample (1970–1991) –N = 264 Second sub-sample (1992–2012) –N = 252
AR(1) W = 1 W = 0 W = 0.5 AR(1) W = 1 W = 0 W = 0.5
φ0 0.0788* 0.0762* 0.0757* 0.0741* –0.0249 –0.0439 –0.0204 0.0350
(2.77) (2.65) (2.58) (2.53) (–0.75) (–1.37) (–0.30) (0.54)
φ1 –0.0130 –0.0127 –0.0130 –0.01250.0050*** 0.0084*** 0.0042** –0.0051
(–2.49) (–2.41) (–2.45) (–2.38) (0.95) (1.62) (0.38) (–0.47)
φC 0.1164* 0.2161* –0.2703*** –0.5908***
(1.91) (1.69) (–4.39) (–4.61)
φF –0.0145 –0.0137 –0.0022 –0.0797
(–0.98) (–0.45) (–0.08) (–1.38)
R2 2.30% 3.73% 2.74% 3.81% 0.36% 7.51% 0.36% 8.21%
adj-R2 1.93% 2.99% 1.99% 2.70% –0.04% 6.77% –0.44% 7.10%
F-stat 6.1750 5.0410 3.6680 3.4160 0.8946 10.1000 0.4485 7.3970
d f 1/262 2/260 2/260 3/259 1/250 2/249 2/249 3/248
p-val 0.0136 0.0071 0.0269 0.0180 0.3452 6.04×10−5 0.6391 9.14×10−5
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Table 4: Switching results for the model given by (5) for fullsample period (1970–2012). Significance levels: 1%
(***), 5% (**), 10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets. Model: ∆Pt+1 = φ0 + φ1Pt + φC
[





(1−Wt(st, γ, c))(Ft − Pt)
]
+ et+1, where a negative (positive) coefficient ofφ1 indicates mean-reversion (explo-
siveness) associated with real economy factors, a positive(negative) coefficient ofφC andφF implies trend-following
(contrarian) chartists and stabilizing (trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively. PD (profit difference) and PDA
(risk-adjusted) are strategy-dependent switching variables and STD (volatility), DF (deviation from fundamental) and
DFA (risk-adjusted) are market-dependent switching variables. Note thatµs andσs denote the mean and standard
deviation of each switching variable.
Full sample (1970–2012) –N = 516
Static PD PDA STD DF DFA
φ0 0.0460 0.0448 0.0449 0.0763** 0.0454 0.0668**
(2.40) (2.19) (2.19) (2.84) (2.37) (3.33)
φ1 –0.0072 –0.0071 –0.0071 –0.0129 –0.0072 –0.0107*
(–2.18) (–2.04) (–2.05) (–2.83) (–2.14) (–3.13)
φC –0.0382 –0.2199*** –0.2160*** –0.0909 0.3199*** 1.3694***
(–0.42) (–2.94) (–2.93) (–1.33) (4.28) (6.21)
φF –0.0391* –0.0268** –0.0265** –0.0632*** –0.0211 –0.0044
(–1.86) (–2.56) (–2.55) (–5.04) (–1.51) (–0.43)
γ 9.41 14.68 ∞ ∞ ∞
c 0.0780 0.5442 11.8739
µs 0.0074 0.1977 0.0551 0.2324 5.0025
σs 0.0428 0.7414 0.0246 0.2127 3.8413
L 8 8 35 8
R2 1.40% 3.72% 3.71% 5.94% 4.46% 7.91%
adj-R2 0.82% 3.16% 3.15% 5.35% 3.90% 7.36%
F-stat 2.4200 6.4790 6.4620 10.0493 7.9459 14.4239
d f 3/511 3/503 3/503 3/477 3/511 3/504
p-val 0.0653 2.62×10−4 2.68×10−4 1.97×10−6 3.46×10−5 4.99×10−9
35
Table 5: Switching results for the model given by (5) for the first sub-sample period (1970–1991). Significance levels:
1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets.Model:∆Pt+1 = φ0+φ1Pt+φC
[





(1−Wt(st, γ, c))(Ft − Pt)
]
+ et+1, where a negative (positive) coefficient ofφ1 indicates mean-reversion (explo-
siveness) associated with real economy factors, a positive(negative) coefficient ofφC andφF implies trend-following
(contrarian) chartists and stabilizing (trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively. PD (profit difference) and PDA
(risk-adjusted) are strategy-dependent switching variables and STD (volatility), DF (deviation from fundamental) and
DFA (risk-adjusted) are market-dependent switching variables. Note thatµs andσs denote the mean and standard
deviation of each switching variable.
First sub-sample (1970–1991) –N = 264
Static PD PDA STD DF DFA
φ0 0.0741* 0.0983** 0.0943* 0.1084 0.0842* 0.1223**
(2.53) (2.93) (2.81) (2.05) (2.83) (2.99)
φ1 –0.0125 –0.0159 –0.0152 –0.0173 –0.0141 –0.0201
(–2.38) (–2.63) (–2.52) (–1.85) (–2.66) (–2.75)
φC 0.2161* 0.2209*** 0.2133*** 0.2594*** 0.3515*** 0.2468***
(1.69) (2.90) (2.80) (2.87) (3.88) (3.00)
φF –0.0137 0.1803*** 0.1760*** 0.0580*** 0.0120 0.0910***
(–0.45) (3.06) (3.05) (2.71) (0.48) (2.64)
γ 4.56 4.25 –∞ ∞ ∞
c 0.0834 0.5760 5.50
µs 0.0130 0.1766 0.0679 0.2582 4.2904
σs 0.0489 0.6569 0.0248 0.2552 3.5721
L 12 12 36 24
R2 3.81% 10.06% 9.91% 10.43% 7.97% 10.61%
adj-R2 2.70% 9.02% 8.87% 9.23% 6.91% 9.47%
F-stat 3.4160 9.2111 9.0597 8.6905 7.4789 9.3344
d f 3/259 3/247 3/247 3/224 3/259 3/236
p-val 0.0180 8.46×10−6 1.03×10−5 1.77×10−5 8.06×10−5 7.43×10−6
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Table 6: Switching results for the model given by (5) for the second sub-sample periods (1992–2012). Signif-
icance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets. Model:∆Pt+1 = φ0 + φ1Pt +
φC
[




(1−Wt(st, γ, c))(Ft − Pt)
]
+ et+1, where a negative (positive) coefficient of φ1 in-
dicates mean-reversion (explosiveness) associated with real economy factors, a positive (negative) coefficient ofφC
andφF implies trend-following (contrarian) chartists and stabilizing (trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively.
PD (profit difference) and PDA (risk-adjusted) are strategy-dependent switching variables and STD (volatility), DF
(deviation from fundamental) and DFA (risk-adjusted) are market-dependent switching variables. Note thatµs andσs
denote the mean and standard deviation of each switching variable.
Second sub-sample (1992–2012) –N = 252
Static PD PDA STD DF DFA
φ0 0.0350 0.0326 0.0039 0.0589 0.0025 0.0468
(0.54) (0.60) (0.08) (1.44) (0.04) (1.23)
φ1 –0.0051 –0.0047 0.0002* –0.0092 0.0004* –0.0071
(–0.47) (–0.52) (0.02) (–1.36) (0.04) (–1.12)
φC –0.5908*** –0.5669*** –0.5333*** –0.4397*** –0.9379*** –0.3300***
(–4.61) (–5.01) (–4.81) (–6.09) (–5.29) (–5.30)
φF –0.0797 –0.0951* –0.0701 –0.0657*** –0.0349 –0.0714***
(–1.38) (–1.86) (–1.42) (–3.39) (–1.39) (–3.27)
γ –0.45 –0.58 ∞ ∞ –∞
c 0.0611 0.5085 8.8329
µs 0.0017 0.0762 0.0386 0.2053 7.5863
σs 0.0163 0.3976 0.0343 0.1522 8.5599
L 21 21 3 3
R2 8.21% 9.90% 9.10% 17.57% 15.39% 14.39%
adj-R2 7.10% 8.81% 8.00% 16.57% 14.36% 13.35%
F-stat 7.3970 9.0797 8.2792 17.6218 15.0339 13.8909
d f 3/248 3/248 3/248 3/248 3/248 3/248
p-val 9.14×10−5 1.00×10−5 2.86×10−5 2.11×10−10 5.07×10−9 2.11×10−8
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Table 7: Asymmetric model: Switching results for the gold price with asymmetric demand for full sample pe-
riod (1970–2012). Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets. Model:









where a negative (positive) coefficient ofφ1 indicates mean-reversion (explosiveness) associated with real economy
factors, a positive (negative) coefficient of φC· andφF· implies trend-following (contrarian) chartists and stabiliz-
ing (trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively. PD(profit difference) and PDA (risk-adjusted) are strategy-
dependent switching variables and STD (volatility), DF (deviation from fundamental) and DFA (risk-adjusted) are
market-dependent switching variables. Note thatµs andσs denote the mean and standard deviation of each switching
variable.
Full sample (1970–2012) –N = 516
Static PD PDA STD DF DFA
φ0 0.0428 0.0424 0.0426 0.0643 0.0390 0.0687**
(2.21) (2.05) (2.06) (2.34) (2.06) (3.33)
φ1 –0.0074 –0.0066 –0.0066 –0.0122 –0.0072 –0.0114**
(–2.24) (–1.87) (–1.88) (–2.67) (–2.21) (–3.31)
φCp 0.0293 –0.2896** –0.2888** –0.0615 –0.0444 1.4766***
(0.21) (–2.54) (–2.56) (–0.65) (–0.31) (6.48)
φCm –0.1372 –0.1386 –0.1332 –0.1416 5.5480*** –1.0348
(–0.74) (–1.11) (–1.08) (–1.28) (4.07) (–0.81)
φFp 0.0655 0.0123 0.0091 0.0841 0.0619 0.0204
(0.63) (0.19) (0.15) (1.56) (1.20) (0.40)
φFm –0.0504* –0.0267** –0.0264** –0.0893*** –0.0451*** –0.0096
(–1.81) (–2.16) (–2.15) (–5.60) (–3.35) (–0.76)
γ 10.30 14.30 ∞ ∞ ∞
c 0.0772 0.9691 11.8739
µs 0.0074 0.1977 0.0552 0.2324 5.0025
σs 0.0428 0.7414 0.0244 0.2127 3.8413
L 8 8 36 8
R2 1.70% 3.98% 3.98% 7.46% 5.79% 8.59%
adj-R2 0.73% 3.02% 3.03% 6.48% 4.86% 7.68%
F-stat 1.7610 4.1483 4.1577 7.6412 6.2560 9.4384
d f 5/509 5/501 5/501 5/474 5/509 5/502
p-val 0.1193 0.0011 0.0011 6.39×10−7 1.21×10−5 1.30×10−8
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Table 8: Asymmetric model: Switching results for the gold price with asymmetric demand for the first sub-sample
period (1970-1991). Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**),10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets. Model:









where a negative (positive) coefficient ofφ1 indicates mean-reversion (explosiveness) associated with real economy
factors, a positive (negative) coefficient of φC· andφF· implies trend-following (contrarian) chartists and stabiliz-
ing (trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively. PD(profit difference) and PDA (risk-adjusted) are strategy-
dependent switching variables and STD (volatility), DF (deviation from fundamental) and DFA (risk-adjusted) are
market-dependent switching variables. Note thatµs andσs denote the mean and standard deviation of each switching
variable.
First sub-sample (1970–1991) –N = 264
Static PD PDA STD DF DFA
φ0 0.0836* 0.0956* 0.0889* 0.0677 0.0621 0.1272*
(2.88) (2.80) (2.59) (1.33) (2.15) (2.80)
φ1 –0.0170* –0.0162 –0.0148 –0.0128 –0.0131 –0.0211
(–3.13) (–2.58) (–2.33) (–1.45) (–2.47) (–2.61)
φCp 0.4843** 0.2914*** 0.2818*** 0.4939*** –0.0118 0.2819***
(2.53) (2.90) (2.82) (4.03) (–0.07) (2.72)
φCm –0.2110 0.0436 0.0115 –0.2209 5.8072*** 0.1379
(–0.77) (0.24) (0.06) (–0.99) (3.44) (0.69)
φFp 0.4956 0.2355 0.1669 1.1357*** 0.2836** 0.1051
(2.07) (1.22) (0.89) (3.17) (2.42) (0.85)
φFm –0.0318 0.1577** 0.1769** 0.0278 –0.0599*** 0.1059**
(–0.85) (1.98) (2.27) (1.30) (–3.25) (2.17)
γ 4.26 3.62 –∞ 4.00 ∞
c 0.0856 0.9940 5.1992
µs 0.0130 0.1766 0.0672 0.2582 4.2265
σs 0.0489 0.6569 0.0255 0.2552 3.6679
L 12 12 33 28
R2 6.91% 10.50% 10.47% 15.02% 10.46% 11.63%
adj-R2 5.10% 8.67% 8.64% 13.13% 8.71% 9.71%
F-stat 3.8140 5.7480 5.7278 7.9546 6.0017 6.0541
d f 5/257 5/245 5/245 5/225 5/257 5/230
p-val 0.0024 4.90×10−5 5.10×10−5 6.38×10−7 2.85×10−5 2.75×10−5
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Table 9: Asymmetric model: Switching results for the gold price with asymmetric demand for the second sub-sample
period (1992–2012). Significance levels: 1% (***), 5% (**),10% (*); t-values are denoted in brackets. Model:









where a negative (positive) coefficient ofφ1 indicates mean-reversion (explosiveness) associated with real economy
factors, a positive (negative) coefficient of φC· andφF· implies trend-following (contrarian) chartists and stabiliz-
ing (trend-following) fundamentalists, respectively. PD(profit difference) and PDA (risk-adjusted) are strategy-
dependent switching variables and STD (volatility), DF (deviation from fundamental) and DFA (risk-adjusted) are
market-dependent switching variables. Note thatµs andσs denote the mean and standard deviation of each switching
variable.
Second sub-sample (1992–2012) –N = 252
Static PD PDA STD DF DFA
φ0 0.0599 0.0570 0.0544 0.0083 0.0429 0.0254
(0.87) (0.99) (0.95) (0.20) (0.73) (0.64)
φ1 –0.0086 –0.0085 –0.0081 –0.0010 –0.0075 –0.0024
(–0.73) (–0.86) (–0.83) (–0.14) (–0.75) (–0.36)
φCp –1.0324*** –0.9180*** –0.9148*** –0.5572*** –0.8113*** –0.5071***
(–4.97) (–5.58) (–5.51) (–5.21) (–4.31) (–4.93)
φCm –0.0859 –0.1352 –0.1367 –0.2206* –72.5297** –0.1185
(–0.38) (–0.71) (–0.71) (–1.85) (–2.28) (–1.02)
φFp –0.0670 –0.0577 –0.0611 0.0148 0.0149 –0.1101
(–0.65) (–0.54) (–0.54) (0.29) (0.30) (–1.59)
φFm –0.1295 –0.1689** –0.1684** –0.0667*** –0.0756** –0.0435*
(–1.64) (–2.32) (–2.27) (–2.58) (–2.22) (–1.68)
γ –0.41 –0.46 62.00 ∞ –∞
c 0.0473 0.5085 8.8329
µs 0.0008 0.0146 0.0386 0.2053 7.5863
σs 0.0110 0.2511 0.0343 0.1522 8.5599
L 36 36 3 3
R2 10.83% 13.99% 13.67% 20.03% 17.43% 15.98%
adj-R2 8.98% 12.24% 11.91% 18.40% 15.76% 14.27%
F-stat 5.9760 8.0011 7.7902 12.3195 10.3889 9.3568
d f 5/246 5/246 5/246 5/246 5/246 5/246
p-val 3.08×10−5 5.24×10−7 7.99×10−7 1.13×10−10 4.69×10−9 3.55×10−8
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